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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
MICHELLE ANN COX, : Case No. 20100947-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is not incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Forgery, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (2008), and Theft by Deception, a Class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405 (2008), in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Robert Faust presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(Supp. 2010). The judgment is attached hereto as "Addendum A." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether the burden of proof was shifted to the defendant in violation of 
her constitutional Due Process rights when the jury was instructed that the defendant was 
required to present evidence that she had an honest belief that she was lawfully entitled to 
cash the check and receive the proceeds therefrom. 
1 
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1 
Standard of Review: "Determining the propriety of the instructions submitted to 
the jury presents a question of law, which we review for correctness." State v. Reyes. 
2004 UT App. 8, f 15, 84 P.3d 841 (citation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was not preserved. This Court will review unpreserved 
claims for plain error, see, State v. Patrick. 2009 UT App 226, f 12,217 P.3d 1150, for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, see, e.g.. State v. Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, |30, 
i 
94 P.3d 186, and to avoid manifest injustice. See, State v. Turner. 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah 
App. 1987) (citing Utah R. Crim. Pro. 19(c)). 
Issue II: Did the trial court err by failing to sentence Appellant on Count II of the 
Information pursuant to the reduced penalty in effect at the time of her sentencing but, 
instead, sentenced Appellant to the greater penalty which was in effect for this crime at 
the time the Information was filed? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997). 
Preservation: This issue was not raised in the district court. However, this Court 
will review unpreserved claims for plain error, see. State v. Patrick. 2009 UT App 226, | 
f 12, 217 P.3d 1150, for ineffective assistance of counsel, see, e.g.. State v. Nelson-
Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, f50, 94 P.3d 186. Additionally, this Court can review this illegal 
I 
sentence under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Brooks. 908 
P.2d 856, 859-60 (Utah 1995). 
i 
2 
I 
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RULES, STATUTES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of following relevant provisions is set forth in full at Addendum B: 
United States Constitution, Amend. XIV; Utah Constitutions, Art. I, Sec. 7; Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-401(2008); Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402 (2008); Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405 
(2008); Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (2008); Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (Supp. 2010); 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 12, 2010, the State of Utah filed an Information against Michelle Cox 
(hereinafter "Cox") which included one count of Forgery, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-501 (2008) and one count of Theft by Deception, in violation of Utah Code Ann 
§76-6-405(2008). R. 1-2. On March 30, 2010, a preliminary hearing was held and the 
magistrate bound Cox over for trial on all charges. R. 151. 
A trial was held in this matter on August 3-4, 2010. R. 152, 156. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts. R. 156:377. 
On November 8, 2010, Cox was sentenced to a term of 0-5 years in prison on count I of 
the Information, and a term of 365 days in jail on count II of the Information. R. 107-08. 
These terms were suspended, and Cox was ordered to serve 30 days jail as a condition of 
probation. R. 107-08. 
Cox filed a notice of appeal on November 16, 2010. R. 124-25. Therefore, this 
appeal is timely. See, Utah R. App. Pro. 4(a) (2010). 
3 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On September 10, 2009, a vehicle belonging to Kathy Aller (hereinafter "Aller") was 
broken into while it was parked in a parking lot. R. 152:139. Items were taken from the car 
including checks from Aller's checking account. R. 152:140. Aller had not given anyone 
permission to take any of her property out of the car. R. 152:140. 
The checking account in question was a joint account, shared by Aller and her father, Don 
Butler (hereinafter "Butler"). R. 152:141. Aller had not met Cox prior to the trial, nor had Aller 
authorized Cox or anyone else other than Butler to write checks on or withdraw funds from her 
account. R. 152:140. Butler also testified that he had not authorized anyone else to write checks 
i 
or make charges on their account. R. 152:171. He also was not acquainted with Cox and had 
"[n]ever seen her before." R. 152:171. 
Aller reported the vehicle burglary to the police. R. 152:144-45. The next day, 4 
September 11, 2009, Aller also reported to her credit union that the checks had been taken. R. 
152:144, 147. Aller filled out a fraud report with the credit union, which was signed by both her 
and Butler. R. 152:149. 
On September 11, 2009, an individual presented a check on Aller's account at a Mountain 
America Credit Union branch in Salt Lake County. R. 152:160-62. The check was written out to 
"Michelle Cox" as the payee, in the amount of $360. R. 152:189-90. The back of the check was 
endorsed with the name of "Michelle Cox." R. 152:188. The check was cashed, and the person 
presenting the check received $360 in proceeds from the check. R. 152:164. Aller testified that 
she had not signed the check, nor had she authorized anyone else to sign the check. R. 152:145-
47, 152. 
4 
4 
4 
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When contacted by police, Cox confirmed that she had cashed the check in question. R. 
156:249. Cox also testified at trial that she cashed the check in question. R. 156:295. Although 
the evidence relating to how Cox came to possess the check is somewhat conflicting, Cox 
maintained that she did not know the check was stolen when she cashed it. R. 156:295. 
Salt Lake City Police Detective Brenden Kirkwood (hereinafter "Kirkwood") interviewed 
Coxaspartof his investigation relating to the stolen check. R. 156:249. Kirkwood testified that 
Cox initially claimed to have received the check as payment for services she had provided as a 
manicurist. R. 156:250. Kirkwood testified that he was not able to confirm this information 
with the salon where Cox was employed. R. 156:251. 
Kirkwood testified that when he informed Cox that he was not able to confirm Cox's 
claim with her supervisor, Cox stated that the services had not been provided at the salon. R. 
156:251. Kirkwood testified that Cox stated that the services had been provided at her house, for 
a group of 12 people, and that she had been paid by a friend, Katarina Dominguez (hereinafter 
"Dominguez"). R. 156:251-52. 
Kirkwood testified that Cox initially claimed that Dominguez had told her that she had 
received the check in exchange for purchasing gas for an unknown female at a gas station. R. 
156:253. Kirkwood further testified that Cox later claimed that Dominguez had told her that the 
check belonged to Dominguez' mother, and offered to give Cox a portion of the proceeds from 
the check if she would cash it for her. R. 156:254. Kirkwood testified that Cox stated that she 
had filled out the amount and wrote her name on the "pay to the order o f line. R. 156:255. 
Kirkwood testified that Cox believed that Dominguez had signed the check. R. 156:256-57. 
5 
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I 
Cox testified at trial. While Cox admitted to receiving the check from Dominguez and 
cashing the check, her testimony differed from the testimony given by Kirkwood in a number of 
respects. 
Cox testified at trial that she had received the check from Dominguez, and that 
Dominguez told her the check belonged to her mother. R. 156:301-02. Cox testified that 
Dominguez told her that her mother had not had time to cash the check, and that Dominguez was 
not able to cash the check due to problems with her own account. R. 156:301. I 
Cox testified that when Ms. Dominguez gave her the check, Dominguez showed her an 
ID which she claimed was her mother's ID. R. 156:302. Cox acknowledged that the name on 
the check did not match Dominguez' last name, but pointed out that Dominguez had been 
married and had taken her husband's last name. R. 156:315. 
When Cox received the check, the numeric amount was filled in for $360, and it had been 
signed and dated. R. 156:301-02. However, the written amount and the payee line were blank. 
R. 156:301. 
Dominguez drove Cox to the nearest Mountain America branch to cash the check. R. 
156:303-04. On the way to the credit union, Dominguez asked Cox to fill in her name on the 
"pay to the order o f line and to fill in the written amount. R. 156:305. Ms. Cox complied with 
that request. R. 156:305. 
Upon arriving at the credit union, Dominguez parked the car and Cox went inside to cash 
the check. R. 156:304. At the teller station, Cox endorsed the back of the check and provided 
identification. R. 156:305-06. 
After cashing the check, Cox returned to Dominguez' car and gave all the cash to 
I 
Dominguez. R. 156:306. Dominguez thanked Cox and gave her $60 back. R. 156:306. 
6 
I 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I: The charges of forgery and theft by deception both arose from 
allegations that Cox had cashed a forged check at a credit union, and received proceeds 
from the check totaling $360. As a necessary element of the charge of theft by deception, 
the State was required to prove that Cox used deception in order to obtain or exercise 
control over the property of another. As a necessary element of the charge of forgery, the 
State was required to prove that Cox acted with a purpose to defraud or knowledge that 
she was facilitating a fraud. 
In order to cash the check, Cox made representations, explicit or implied, that she 
was lawfully authorized to cash the check and receive the proceeds therefrom. The fraud 
element of forgery and the deception element of theft by deception both require proof that 
Cox did not honestly believe the representations she made when cashing the forged 
check. However, the jury was instructed that Cox was required to present evidence that 
she had an honest belief that her representations were true or that she had an honest claim 
of right to the property she obtained. This instruction unconstitutionally shifted the 
burden of proof to the defendant to disprove required elements of the charged offenses. 
Constitutional due process protections clearly establish that the State must bear the 
burden of proving each element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Case 
law also clearly establishes that a jury instruction that shifts the burden of proof to the 
defendant to disprove an element of the offense violates the defendant's due process 
rights under the United States and Utah constitutions. This error can therefore be 
7 
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reviewed by this Court under a plain error analysis or under an ineffective assistance of 
counsel analysis because defense counsel failed to object to the State's jury instruction. 
ISSUE II: The trial judge imposed a sentence on Count II of the Information which 
was greater than that allowed by law. The jury convicted Cox of Theft by Deception, for 
unlawfully obtaining $360 from a credit union by cashing a forged check. At the time of 
the offense, theft by deception of property valued at $360 constituted a class A 
4 
misdemeanor. But at the time of Cox's sentencing, the legislature had amended the law 
to make theft by deception a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property taken was 
less than $500. 
Pursuant to long-established case law, Cox was entitled to the benefit of the lower 
penalty in effect at the time of her sentencing. The imposition of an incorrect sentence 
was plain error since it was obvious under the existing law and statutes. The incorrect 
sentence also prejudiced Cox as it imposed a greater penalty than that allowed by the 
legislature. 
Long-standing Utah case law clearly establishes that when the legislature amends a 
criminal statute to lower the level of the offense, a defendant is entitled to be sentenced at 
the lower level in effect at the time of sentencing. This illegal sentence can therefore be 
reviewed by this Court on appeal under a plain error analysis, under Rule 22(e) of the 
4 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis 
because her attorney failed to argue that the amended law required sentencing as a class B 
misdemeanor. 
8 
i 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT SHE HAD AN HONEST BELIEF THAT THE 
CHECK WAS LEGITIMATE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTED THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT. 
Cox was charged in an Information filed on February 12, 2010 with the crimes of 
Forgery in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (2008) and Theft by Deception in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405 (2008). R. 1-2. At trial a trial held on August 3-
4, 2010, the jury found Cox guilty of said offense. R. 152; 156:377. 
Both of these charges contain elements that, in the context of the present case, 
required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cox had used false or 
misleading information or misrepresentations for the purpose of cashing a check and 
obtaining the proceeds therefrom. See, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501; Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-405. Jury Instruction 33 unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof from the State, 
and instead required Cox to present evidence that she had an honest belief that she was 
legally entitled to cash that check. 
A. THE STATE BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING EACH AND EVERY 
ELEMENT OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE: REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO 
DISPROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE VIOLATES BOTH FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS. 
There are few if any principles as fundamental to the American system of criminal 
justice and the constitutional requirements of Due Process as those of the presumption of 
innocense and the requirement that the prosecution must bear the burden of proving each 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 
9 
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1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 268 (1970); State v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689 (Utah 1982). The United 
States Supreme Court has referred to the presumption of innocense as "that bedrock 
'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law.'" Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895)). 
The presumption of innocense is given "concrete substance" by the requirement 
I 
that each element of a criminal offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship, 
397 U.S. at 363. "It is elementary that in criminal cases the State has the burden of 
proving every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Hendricks, 258 P.2d 452, 453 (Utah 1953). 
A defendant's Due Process rights under both the United States and Utah 
i 
constitutions are violated if the burden of disproving an essential element of a crime is 
shifted to the defendant. State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 777-78 (Utah App. 1980) (citing In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); State v. Starks, 
627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 468-69 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988)). "[T]he prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the defendant need not 
prove innocense." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, f 10 n.5, 988 P.2d 949. 
(1) Requiring the defendant to present evidence of an honest belief or honest 
claim of right is equivalent to requiring the defendant to disprove the element of 4 
deception in a charge of theft by deception. 
In the present case, Jury Instruction No. 33 instructed the jury that the Cox was required 
to present evidence that she "(a) acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 4 
10 
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involved; or (b) acted in the honest belief that she had the right to obtain or exercise control over 
the property or service involved; or (c) obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented." R. 94. Although 
apparently based on Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(3) (2008), this instruction 
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. 
The Court of Appeals has previously enumerated "three separate components" of 
the deception element in a charge of theft by deception: "(1) that defendant's act satisfied 
the statutory definition of deception, (2) that the deception occurred contemporaneously 
with the transaction in question, and (3) that the victim relied upon the deception, at least 
to some degree, in parting with the property." State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 
App. 1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). It is this first component of 
deception, an act that "satisfied the statutory definition of deception," that is the subject 
of incorrect and confusing jury instructions which had the effect of shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendant in the present case. 
The jury was instructed, in conformity with Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(5) (2008), 
as follows: 
"Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: (a) Creates or 
confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to be true . . . ; or (b) Fails 
to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct. . . and that the actor 
does not now believe to be true, 
R. 92 (emphasis added). This instruction further stated that an act of deception is a necessary 
element of the crime of theft by deception, and that the jury must be convinced beyond a 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonable doubt of each element of the crime before they could reach a verdict of guilty. R. 92. 
The jury was also instructed generally that the "prosecution has the burden of proof" R. 81. 
However, the jury was also instructed as follows: 
[I]t is a defense to the charge of theft by deception that the 
Defendant: 
(a) acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) acted in the honest belief that she had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property or service involved; or 
(c) obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have 
consented." 
R. 94. This instruction further stated that evidence of this kind of honest belief "must be 
presented by the defendant." R. 94. This instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden 
to the defendant to disprove an element of the offense of theft by deception. 
A reasonably diligent search of Utah case law reveals two opinions that touch on 
the "honest belief or "honest claim of right" defense in the context of a charge of theft 
by deception: State v. Vigil 922 P.2d 15 (Utah App. 1996) and State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 
568 (Utah 1985). Neither of these cases supports the position that the honest claim of 
right defense instruction was properly given in the present case. 
In Vigil the defendant argued on appeal that it was ineffective assistance for 
counsel to fail to request and plain error for the trial judge to fail to include an honest 
belief jury instruction in a charge of theft by deception. Vigil 922 P.2d at 28. The Court 
of Appeals disagreed, holding that since the defense case was not based on an honest 
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belief defense, it was not error to fail to request or include an honest belief instruction. 
Id at 29. 
The defendant in Vigil along with his wife, had communicated with three separate 
attorneys in regard to the possibility of placing their expected child up for adoption by 
three separate prospective adoptive couples. Vigil 922 P.2d at 18-22. Payments to the 
Vigils had been made by each of the prospective adoptive couples, io cover living 
expenses and other costs associated with the pregnancy. Id The Vigils ultimately did not 
give the chid up for adoption after it was born, and did not return any of the money they 
had received. Id 
Defense counsel at trial had asserted that any "misunderstandings occurred as a 
result of conduct of the attorneys" and that the defendant did not personally "obtain or 
exercise control over the money." Id. at 29. Thus, the Court of Appeals stated that 
"because defendant's defense at trial was not based on the [honest belief] defense, we 
conclude no error existed which could have been plain to the trial court." Id (citing State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 489 (Utah 1988) ("where instruction was inconsistent with 
defendant's theory of the case, no error in refusing instruction"). 
In Noren, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial judge committed error by 
refusing to include a requested jury instruction on the defense of an honest claim of right 
to a charge of theft by deception. Noren, 704 P.2d at 571. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court, holding that the requested instruction had not been supported by the 
evidence. Id. at 571. 
13 
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i 
The charges against the defendant in Noren included two counts of theft by 
deception. Id at 569. The first count was based on an allegation that Noren had 
convinced an individual to take out a loan to be secured by a motor home and to deliver 
the proceeds of the loan to Noren, without telling that individual that the motor home was 
already encumbered by a previous loan as well as a lease-back agreement with another 
party. Id. at 569. The second count was based on an allegation that Noren had sold the 
motor home to a second individual under a lease-back program, receiving over $22,000 
from that individual, without informing that individual of the other encumberances already 
on the motor home. Id at 569. 
Noren contended on appeal that he had acted under an honest claim of right when 
he obtained the funds. Id. at 571. However, in affirming the trial court's refusal to give 
the instruction, the Utah Supreme Court stated that there was "no evidence before the trial 
court to support that defense" and that "without some evidence at trial to justify a 
requested instruction, the court is correct in refusing." Id at 571 (citing State v. Hafen, 
593 P.2d 538 (1979). 
Both Noren and Vigil clearly establish that when the evidence does not support an 
honest belief defense, it is not error to refuse to give an honest belief instruction. Noren, 
704 P.2d 571; Vigil 922 P.2d at 29. Although it is possible that a person could use false 
representations to obtain control over property to which the person had an honest claim of 
right, the evidence at trial in the present case did not present such a set of facts. The issue 
i 
14 
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in the present case is whether it was error to include an instruction on an honest claim of 
right defense that shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. 
A necessary element of the charge of theft by deception is that Cox obtained 
property "by deception" when she cashed the check. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405. The 
prosecution was required to prove that when Cox impliedly represented that she was 
authorized to cash the check and legally entitled to receive the funds therefrom, she 
intended to "[c]reate[] or confirm[] by words or by conduct an impression of law or fact 
that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true" Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(5) 
(emphasis added). Jury Instruction 32 informed the jury, in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-401(5), that an act of deception requires proof that the defendant created or 
failed to correct a false impression of law or fact, and requires proof that the defendant did 
not believe the impression of law or fact to be true. 
In the present case, the relevant impression created by Cox was that she was 
authorized to cash the check in question and receive the funds therefrom. Thus, under the 
Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution, Amend. XIV, and Utah 
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7, the State had the burden of proving that Cox did not believe 
that she was authorized to cash the check and receive the funds therefrom. See, State v. 
lebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 777-78 (Utah App. 1980) (citing In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 
S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Storks, 627 P.2d at 92; Sorenson. 758 P.2d at 
468-69); see also. Patterson v. New York. 432 U.S. 197, 215, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2329-30, 53 
L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). 
15 
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On the contrary, an honest claim of right defense requires proof that the defendant 
acted with "an honest claim of right to the property " or with an "honest belief that he had 
the right to obtain or exercise control over the property." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(3) 
(emphasis added). Jury Instruction 33 instructed the jury that evidence that Cox acted with 
such an honest belief "must be presented by the defense." R. 94. 
In the context of the present case, an honest belief or honest claim of right defense 
I 
as set forth in Jury Instruction 33 required Cox to produce evidence that she honestly 
believed she was authorized to cash the check. R. 94 ("evidence of this defense must be 
presented by the defense"). This requirement that Cox present evidence that she had an 
honest belief that she was legally entitled to cash the check is in direct conflict with the 
constitutional requirement that the State bear the burden of proving that she did not believe 
she was lawfully entitled to cash the check. Tebbs, 786 P.2d at 777-78 (citations omitted). 
Because the issue involved in the honest belief defense is precisely the same issue 
involved in the element of deception, requiring Cox to present evidence of her honest 
belief is precisely the same as requiring Cox to disprove the element of deception. See, 
State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, f 10, 14 P.3d 114. An instruction that "shifts to the 
defendant the burden of disproving an essential element, namely that of a culpable mental 
state . . . violate[s] the Due Process clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions." 
< 
Tebbs, 786 P.2d at 777-78 (citiations omitted). 
Although addressing a different kind of criminal offense, the Court of Appeal's 
opinion in the case of Martinez, 2000 UT App 320 is instructive in the present case. 
16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Martinez addressed the application of strict liability in the context of a charge of unlawful 
sexual activity with a minor. IcL The court's holding demonstrates that when an element 
of an offense and an affirmative defense are the same, a requirement that a party prove an 
element is the same as requiring that party to disprove the affirmative defense. Id. at f 10. 
Martinez contended on appeal that the State still bore the burden of proving a 
culpable mens rea (that the defendant knew or was aware of the risk that his partner was 
under the age of 16) even though Utah Code Ann. §76-2-304.5(2) stated that it was not a 
defense to a charge of unlawful sexual activity with a minor that the defendant mistakenly 
believed that the victim was 16 years of age or older. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320,1HJ8-9. 
In making this argument, Martinez attempted to make a distinction between a defense 
relating to mistake of age and the mens rea element as it related to the age of the victim. 
14 
Contrary to Martinez' position, the Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: 
[I]t is clear that the burden of proving the mens rea for 
unlawful sexual activity with a minor is precisely the same as 
the burden of disproving the affirmative defense of mistake of 
age. That is, proof that Defendant knew or was aware of the 
risk that his partner was under sixteen (Defendant's proposed 
mens rea requirement) is no more or less than proof that 
Defendant did not mistakenly believe his partner was sixteen 
or was unaware of the risk that his partner was under sixteen. 
Thus, to require the State to prove a mens rea is to require the 
State to disprove mistake of fact.. . . 
2000 UT App 320, f 10 (emphasis added). 
Applying the reasoning of Martinez to the present case, it is clear that the burden of 
proving the mens rea for theft by deception for cashing a forged check is precisely the 
17 
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same as the burden of disproving the defense of having an honest belief that she was 
authorized to cash the check. See, Martinez. 2000 UT App 320, ^flO. Proof that Cox did 
not believe the false impression she created when she represented that she was authorized 
to cash the check is no more or less than proof that she did not have an honest belief that 
she was entitled to the proceeds of that check. See, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(3); Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-405; Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, % 10. 
i 
Instructing the jury that Cox had the burden of presenting evidence that she had an 
honest belief that she was entitled to cash the check is precisely the same as placing the 
burden on Cox to disprove the mens rea element of deception. See, Martinez, 2000 UT 
App 320, ^flO. Shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving the mens rea element of 
the offense is a clear violation of the Due Process clauses of both the United States and 
i 
Utah consitutions. See, Tebbs, 786 P.2d at 777-78 (citations omitted). 
(2) The elements of an honest belief, deception, and fraudulent intent are 
sufficiently similar that the instruction on an honest belief created a -
substantial likelihood that the jury would be counfused or misled. 
"The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of 
the case." State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). "The purpose of giving < 
instructions to the jurors is to assist them in understanding issues which they have to 
decide in the case." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). If 
i 
the instructions given are not sufficiently clear such that "they could have misled or 
confused the jury, they have failed to fulfill this duty and thus denied the defendant a fair 
trial.. . . " Potter, 627 P.2d at 78. 
18 
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The charge of forgery requires, among other elements, that the State prove that the 
defendant acted "with purpose to defraud" or "with knowledge that the person is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501(2). The terms 
"defraud" and "fraud" are not specifically defined under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501, nor 
were they defined in the instructions given to the jury in the present case. However, the 
concepts of fraud and the intent to defraud are sufficiently similar to the elements of theft 
by deception that the instruction on an honest claim of right defense created a risk of 
confusing the jury. 
The Supreme Court addressed the definition of "fraud" in the context of a criminal 
charge of filing a false insurance claim in the case of State v. Kitchen, 564 P.2d 760 (Utah 
1977). The court utilized a dictionary definition of "fraud" which defined the term as 
including "an intentional misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing another in reliance 
upon it to part with some valuable thing." kL at 763 (citing Webster's New International 
Dictionary of The English Language, Unabridged, 1961). 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the concept of "fraudulent intent" in the 
context of a criminal charge of identity fraud in the case of State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 
155, 71 P.3d 624. Noting that the identity fraud statute itself did not define "fraudulent 
intent," the court adopted the Black's Law Dictionary definition which states that 
fraudulent intent "exists where one, either with a view of benefitting oneself or misleading 
another into a course of action, makes a representation which one knows to be false or 
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which one does not believe to be true." kL at f 14 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 662 
(6th ed. 1990)). 
The Court of Appeals also discussed the definition of fraud in the context of an 
arbitration award in the case of Fleming v. Simper, 2007 UT App 102, 158 P.3d 1110. 
Noting that Utah courts had not defined "fraud" as applied to arbitration awards, the court 
adopted the reasoning of other courts that had held that obtaining an arbitration award by 
i 
means of perjured testimony constituted "fraud." kL at f6 (citing Dogherra v. Safeway 
Stores. Inc.. 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982); Newark Stereotyped Union No. 18 v. 
Newark Morning Ledger Co.. 397 F.2d 594, 598 (3d Cir. 1968)). < 
Each of the definitions of fraud or fraudulent intent used in Kitchen. Chukes, and 
Fleming contain two common elements: (1) the use of some kind of false or misleading 
information or misrepresentation, (2) for the purpose of obtaining some benefit or 
something of value. Kitchen. 564 P.2d at 763; Chukes. 2003 UT App 155, ^ [14; Fleming. 
2007 UT App 102, f6. Similarly, the elements of a charge of theft by deception include 
the use of false or misleading impression of fact or law for the purpose of obtaining or 
exercising control over the property of another. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(5); Utah Code | 
Ann. §76-6-405(1). 
The elements of deception and fraud are sufficiently similar that the Utah Supreme 
Court has even referred to the element of "deception" under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(5) 
as an "element of fraudulent misrepresentation." Sorenson. 617 P.2d at 335. The 
Supreme Court in Sorenson further elaborated, stating, "A conviction of theft by deception 
20 
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requires a determination by the jury that the defendant intentionally made a fraudulent 
misrepresentation." Id, at 337 (citing State v. Howd, 55 Utah 527, 188 P. 628 (1920)). 
In interpreting jury instructions, an appellate court must not consider only the 
intended meaning of the instruction; rather, the court must consider how the jury may have 
interpreted the instruction. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517-19, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 
61 L.Ed.2d. 39 (1979). Jury instructions that are not sufficiently clear, even if technically 
correct, can constitute error. Potter, 627 P.2d at 78. If a reasonable jury could have 
interpreted the instruction as shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, then the 
instruction violates due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. Sandstrom, 
442 U.S. at 524. 
In the present case, the jury was clearly instructed that Cox bore the burden of 
presenting evidence that she had an honest belief that she was lawfully entitled to cash the 
check and receive the proceeds therefrom. R. 94. This is the functional equivalent of 
requiring Cox to disprove the element of deception. See, Martinez, 2000 UT App 320 at 
lio. 
Given the similarities between the concepts of deception and fraud, see, Sorenson, 
617 P.2d at 335-37, there is a likelihood that a reasonable jury could have interpreted the 
instruction as requiring Cox to disprove the element of fraud as well. Since a reasonable 
jury could have interpreted the instructions as shifting the burden of proof to the defendant 
on the forgery charge also, Cox's Due Process rights were violated. See, Sandstrom, 442 
U.S. at 524. 
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(3) An erroneous instruction which unconstitutionally shifts the burden of 
proof to the defendant cannot be cured by another conflicting instruction 
that may correctly state the presumption ofinnocense and burden of proof 
A guilty verdict requires the prosecution to present proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt on each element of an offense. See. Winship. 397 U.S. at 363; Walton. 646 P.2d 
689. Other jury instructions provided general instruction on the presumption ofinnocense 
and the prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 81. However, a 
correct statement of the presumption of innocence in one instruction does not cure another 
instruction which relieves the prosecution of the burden of proof. See. Hendricks. 258 
P.2dat453. 
"Although 0ury] instructions are to be considered as a whole, where they are in 
irreconcilable conflict, they could but confuse or mislead the jury" and reversal is required. 
Hendricks. 258 P.2d at 453; see also. Walton. 646 P.2d at 692 (holding that one instruction 
that correctly stated the State's burden of proving the defendant's guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt did not cure an instruction that erroneously instructed the jury that proof 
of basic facts creates a presumption of ultimate facts). Thus, even though other 
instructions may have correctly stated the presumption ofinnocense and burden of proof, 
the erroneous instruction requires reversal. See. Hendricks. 258 P.2d at 453. 
22 
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B. INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN A WAY THAT SHIFTED THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR AND 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Although defense counsel did not object to the jury instructions at issue in this 
appeal, the instructions may still be reviewed on grounds of plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
(1) It was plain error to instruct the jury that the defendant had the 
burden of presenting evidence that she had an honest belief that she was 
authorized to cash the check. 
An instruction which has not been objected to at trial may still be reviewed on 
appeal to avoid "manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 19. "The plain error standard of 
review is also intended to avoid manifest injustice." State v. Munguia. 2011 UT 5, f 12, _ 
P.3d (citation omitted). "Plain error" and "manifest injustice" have been described as 
being essentially synonymous, see, State v. Alinas. 2007 UT 83, f 10, 171 P.3d 1046, and 
both unpreserved claims of jury instruction error and claims of plain error are reviewed 
under the same standard. State v. Sellers. 2011 UT App 38, f 8, 238 P.3d 70 (citing State 
v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989)). 
"To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that [1] an error exists; [2] the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." 
Munguia. 2011 UT 5 at f 13 (citation omitted). 
As set forth supra at 9-22, it was error to give the jury an instruction which shifted 
to the defendant the burden of disproving an element of the charged offenses. This error 
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should have been obvious to the court. The presumption of innocence and the requirement 
that the prosecution prove each and every element of a charged offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt are elementary requirements of the constitutional Due Process 
protections. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363; Hendricks, 258 P.2d at 453. Given the elementary 
and fundamental nature of the presumption of innocense and the requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the error of shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving 
i 
an element of the crime should have been obvious to the trial court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed a jury instruction that inappropriately shifted 
the burden of proof to the defendant in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process rights in the case of State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987). In Turner, 
trial counsel had not objected to the instruction at issue on appeal Id at 1046. 
Nevertheless, due to the nature of the error and circumstances of the case, the court was 
"compelled to correct the constitutional error and the consequences imposed on [the 
defendant], despite his lack of objection at trial." 14; see also, Walton, 646 P.2d at 692 
(holding that a jury instruction that relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof 
constituted reversible error). * 
(2) Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an instruction which 
deprived his client of a fundamental constitutional protection. 
To succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must meet 
a two part test established by the United States Supreme Court. "[A] defendant must first 
"show that counsel's performance was deficient.. . . Second, the defendant must show 
i 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 
24 
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465 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Accord. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
"The benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). 
"To satisfy the first part of the Strickland two-prong test, a defendant 'must show 
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). In evaluating counsel's 
performance, appellate courts will not engage in second-guessing "trial counsel's 
legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those choice might appear in retrospect." 
Tennyson. 850 P.2d at 465 (citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689). 
Trial counsel for a criminal defendant bears a responsibility to ensure that the jury 
is correctly instructed on issues relating to burden of proof. See, State v. Sellers. 2011 UT 
App 38, ^ fl7, 248 P.3d 70. In light of the fundamental importance requirement that the 
prosecution prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, see, Winship, 397 U.S. at 363, 
trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction that correctly set forth the applicable 
burden of proof "cannot be attributed to any reasonable trial strategy." Sellers, 2011 UT 
App 38, f 17. 
To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, "prejudice," a defendant must 
show "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. .. ." 
25 
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Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465. Necessary to a fair criminal trial is the presumption of 
innocense and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship, 397 U.S. at 
363. A trial in which a defendant was denied the presumption of innocense and in which 
the prosecutor was not required to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt would 
therefore be unfair. See, Id. 
The jury instructions in the present case had the effect of relieving the prosecution 
of the burden of proof, and instead required the defendant to present evidence to disprove 
a critical element of the charged offenses. See, R. 94. This violation of Due Process 
protections resulted in a trial that was fundamentally unfair. See, Winship, 397 U.S. at 
363. 
To demonstrate prejudice under Strickland, it is not necessary to show that the jury 
actually misunderstood or misapplied the jury instructions. State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 
38, f 19, 248 P.3d 70. Rather, the mere risk that the jury may have understood the 
instructions as shifting the burden of proof to the defendant is sufficient to satisfy the 
prejudice prong under Strickland, and to require that the convictions be reversed and the 
matter remanded for new trial. See, Sellers, 2011 UTApp 38, [^19. 
II. BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE HAD REDUCED THE LEVEL OF THE 
CHARGE OF THEFT BY DECEPTION PRIOR TO SENTENCING, COX WAS 
ENTITLED TO BE SENTENCED AT THAT LOWER LEVEL. 
Cox was charged in Count II of the Information with the crime of theft by 
deception in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405. R. 1-2. Under relevant portions of 
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Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412, the level of offense for a charge of theft by deception is 
determined by the value of the property taken. 
The law in effect at the time that charges arose stated that a charge of theft is 
punishable as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property in question is or exceeds 
$300, but is less than $1000. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(d) (2008). However, the 
amended statute in effect at the time Cox was sentenced stated that a charge of theft is 
punishable "as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than $500." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(d) (Supp. 2010). 
It was alleged by the State that Cox obtained cash in the amount of $360 by cashing 
a forged check. R. 1-3. Evidence presented at trial was consistent with this alleged 
amount. R. 152:164. 
Under the earlier Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(d) (2008) the offense would have 
been a class A misdemeanor. However, prior to the time of sentencing, the legislature 
amended the law to provide that theft by deception of property valued at less than $500 
constitutes a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(d) (Supp. 2010). Cox 
was entitled to be sentenced on count II as a class B misdemeanor. State v. Patience, 944 
P.2d 381, 385 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
A. THE LEVEL OF AN OFFENSE IS DETERMINED BY THE LAW IN 
EFFECT AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING. 
Utah appellate courts have "consistently held that'[defendants are entitled to the 
benefit of the lesser penalty afforded by an amended statute made effective prior to their 
sentencing." Patience, 944 P.2d at 385 (quoting State v. Yates. 918 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 
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i 
App. 1996)) (citations omitted); Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990); Harris v. 
Smith, 541 P.2d 343, 344 (Utah 1975) ("the law in force at the time of sentencing 
governfs]). 
This rule was initially adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Belt v. Turner, 479 4 
P.2d 471 (Utah 1971). Relying on People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956), the Belt 
court stated: 
i 
A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime 
represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the 
different treatment is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of 
the criminal law. Nothing is to be gained by imposing the 
more severe penalty after such a pronouncement; the excess in 
punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to 
satisfy a desire for vengeance. 
Belt 479 P.2d at 793 (1971) (citation omitted). 
The rationale for the rule was further set forth by the Supreme Court in State v. 
Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 (Utah 1971). The court stated: 
4 
[I]t is the prerogative of the legislature, expressing the will of 
the people, to fix the penalties for crimes and the courts should 
give effect to the enactment and the effective date thereof as so 
declared.. . . [T]o insist on the prior existing harsher penalty is 
a refusal to accept and keep abreast of the process which has 4 
been continuing over the years of ameliorating and modifying 
the treatment of antisocial behavior by changing the emphasis 
from vengeance and punishment to treatment and 
rehabilitation. In the same tenor are the time-honored rules of 
the criminal law generally favorable to one accused of a crime: 4 
that in case of doubt or uncertainty as to the degree of crime, 
he is entitled to the lesser; and correlated thereto: that as to an 
alternative between a severe or a lenient punishment, he is 
entitled to the latter. 
i 
Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336. 
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The Belt rule applies regardless of whether the defendant caused the delays that 
resulted in sentencing taking place after the effective date of the amended statute. 
Patience, 944 P.2d at 385 (citations omitted). This point is illustrated by the case of State 
v. Yates. 918 P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1996). 
In Yates, the defendant pled guilty to theft involving property valued between $100 
and $250. At the time of his plea, the offense was classified as a class A misdemeanor. 
Id at 137 (citating Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(c) (1995)). Yates was released from jail 
pending sentencing, but missed his appointment for a presentence investigation interview 
and failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. Yates, 918 P.2d at 137. Yates appeared at 
a subsequent hearing, which was continued in an effort to obtain a presentence report. Id. 
Yates again missed his presentence investigation interview appointment, and again failed 
to appear for a second sentencing hearing. Id. Before Yates was arrested, the legislature 
amended the theft statute under which Yates had been charged, making theft of property 
valued at under $300 a class B misdemeanor. Id. at 137-38 (citing Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
412(Supp. 1995)). 
When Yates was finally arrested and sentenced, he argued that he should receive 
the benefit of the amended statute. Yates, 918 P.2d at 138. The trial court refused, and 
imposed sentence as a class A misdemeanor, "noting that it was Yates' own failures to 
appear that had delayed sentencing beyond the effective date of the amended statute. IcL 
The Court of Appeals in Yates reversed the trial court, holding that Yates was entitled to 
be sentenced on a class B misdemeanor. Id. at 140. 
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The Court of appeals stated in Yates that "[dilatory as well as diligent defendants 
are entitled to the benefit of the legislature's amended punishments and lesser sentences." 
Yates, 918 P.2d at 139-40. Thus, even when "the defendant's presentence misconduct 
resulted in the defendant's sentencing being delayed beyond the effective date of the 4 
amendments," the defendant is still entitled to the benefit of the lesser sentence. Patience, 
944 P.2d at 385 (citing Yates, 918 P.2d at 139-40). 
i 
In the present case, the record indicates that Cox missed an appointment for her 
presentence investigation interview and requested a continuance of the sentencing to a date 
beyond the effective date of the amended theft statute. See, R. at 102, 103, 105. 
Nevertheless, under existing caselaw, she is still entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty 
in effect at the time of her sentencing. Yates, 918 P.2d at 139-40. 
B. FAILURE TO SENTENCE THEFT BY DECEPTION AS A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR CONSTITUTED AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE, PLAIN ERROR, 
AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
i 
Although defense counsel did not object to the imposition of the illegal sentence on 
count II, this error may be reviewed on the following grounds: (1) plain error; (2) the 
court's ability to correct an illegal sentence; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. \ 
(1) Sentencing theft by deception as a class A misdemeanor was plain error. 
"To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that [1] an error exists; [2] the 
i 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.55 
Munguia, 2011 UT 5 at f 13 (citation omitted). 
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As set forth supra at 26-30, the trial court committed error by sentencing Cox on 
count II as a class A misdemeanor when theft by deception of property valued at $360 was 
a class B misdemeanor at the time of sentencing. See. Patience. 944 P.2d at 385381 (Utah 
App. 1997). This error should have been obvious to the trial court since the statutory 
penalty had been amended by the legislature and the principle that defendants should be 
given the benefit of the amended lesser penalty had been clearly established in Utah case 
law for nearly forty years. See, Beh 479 P.2d at 792-93; Yates. 918 P.2d at 138; Patience. 
944P.2dat385. 
As this Court stated in Yates: 
Utah law on this question is clear and the instant case does not 
present an exception to the well-established rule: Defendants 
are entitled to lesser criminal punishments mandated by 
statutes that become effective before the court imposes 
sentence. 
Yates. 918 P.2d at 139 (emphasis added). 
The error was prejudicial in that Cox received a harsher penalty for the higher level 
offense. Imposing a sentence harsher than that allowed by law is prejudicial and requires 
reversal. R a t 139-40. 
(2) The sentence imposed by the trial court for theft by deception is an 
illegal sentence that can be reviewed under Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22(e). 
This court may additionally review this illegal sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. 
Pro. 22(e). See, State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 859-60 (Utah 1995). Because Cox is 
attacking the sentence itself, this Court may review this issue for the first time on appeal. 
Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22(e); Brooks. 908 P.2d at 859-60. 
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I 
(3) Trial counsel was ineffective by failing to ask the court to sentence 
theft by deception as a class B misdemeanor. 
This Court can also review this issue for ineffective assistance of counsel at 
sentencing. When claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy a 
4 
two part test established by the United States Supreme Court. "[A] defendant must first 
"show that counsel's performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465 i 
(quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. Accord. Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. 
The first prong of the Strickland test, deficient performance, is satisfied where 
i 
defense counsel failed to argue that Cox should have been sentenced on count II as a class 
B misdemeanor. Utah case law on the principle that a defendant should receive the benefit 
of the amended lesser penalty is clear and well established. See, Belt 479 P.2d at 792-93; 
Yates. 918 P.2d at 138; Patience, 944 P.2d at 385. No argument exists that would justify 
defense counsel failing to argue that Cox should have received the lesser penalty of a class 
B misdemeanor. When no sound strategy supports defense counsel's performance, the 
first prong of the Strickland test is met. State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 
1991). 
The second prong of the Strickland test requires proof of prejudice to the defendant. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). This second prong is ( 
satisfied because the sentence Cox received for count II was harsher than that allowed by 
law. Thus, the case should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Patience, 944 
i 
P.2dat392 
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CONCLUSION 
For the first issue, Cox respectfully requests that the convictions for all counts be 
reversed and that the case be remanded for a new trial. In the alternative, for the second 
issue, Cox respectfully requests that her sentence for theft by deception be vacated and the 
case be remanded for sentencing in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (Supp. 
2010). 
iOfjk 
SUBMITTED this / p t a y of July, 2011. 
'HEN W. HOWAI 
Attorney for DefendantMppellant 
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9 • 3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHELLE ANN COX, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 
Judge: 
Date: 
101901166 FS 
ROBERT FAUST 
November 8, 2 010 
PRESENT 
Clerk: saraj 
Prosecutor: ROSS III, CLIFFORD C 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LILLY, CATHERINE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 16, 1975 
Audio 
Tape Number: N41q Tape Count: 10:20 
E
 FAXED TO ADC 
CHARGES 
1. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/04/2010 Guilty 
2. THEFT BY DECEPTION - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/04/2010 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 3 65 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 335 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Defendant is to report for commitment on 11/12/2010 at 8:30am to 
the Court. 
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/ / 
Case Mo: 101901166 Date: Nov 08, 2010 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $400.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $2 01.62 
Due: $400.00 
Charge # 2 
Total Fine: $400.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $201.62 
Total Principal Due: $400.00 Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 30 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report by November 12, 2010 by 8:30 a.m.. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 400.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Obtain a mental health evaluation and successfully complete any 
recommended treatment. ^S^^nV-* 
Restitution to remain open for 60 days, paid jointly^ and Severally. 
Enter and complete any program or treatment as d^r^te/i B^.AP&P. 
Date: (J r ) ) Q RrrhgA^ 0K ^^UO^ 
I 1 ^ ROBERT FAUST-A %S^'*<-!•/' &;'. i! ^ v - - • vj nD i s t r i c t Court. Jiidgfe- S* <?£ 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-401 
der could be found from proof of facts from 
which it reasonably could have been believed 
that such was intent of defendant, because 
additional facts may be inferred from those 
shown directly by evidence. State v. Kazda, 15 
Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964). 
Recent possess ion of stolen property. 
Statute making unexplained recent posses-
sion of stolen property prima facie evidence of 
larceny applied to offense of robbery when 
larceny and robbery were committed in same 
transaction. State v. Donovan, 77 Utah 343, 
294 P. 1108 (1931). 
Recovery of property by force. 
Defendant, even if he took money from an-
other by force or fear, was not guilty of robbery 
(with revolver), regardless of whatever other 
offense he might have committed in taking of 
money, if money actually belonged to him, and 
its possession by person from whom it was 
taken was wrongful since, in such case, animus 
furandi element of robbery was lacking. People 
v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492 (1895). 
Sentence. 
—Use of a firearm. 
The legislature's 1975 amendment of the 
aggravated robbery statute to specify use of a 
firearm, coupled with the subsequent enact-
ment of the general sentence enhancement pro-
visions, created no ambiguity over what pen-
alty the legislature intended for robbery 
committed with a firearm. The legislature was 
merely increasing the degree of a robbery com-
mitted with the enumerated instruments of 
violence. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Threatening to use weapon. 
Threatening to use a dangerous weapon dur-
ing the commission of a robbery, regardless of 
whether one actually possesses such a weapon, 
is sufficient for a charge of aggravated robbery 
under this section. State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 
310 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Defendant's threats to get a gun and "shoot 
to kill" were sufficient to elevate his offense to 
aggravated robbery even though defendant did 
not possess a gun at the time. State v. Reyos, 
2004 UT App 151, 499 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 91 
P.3d 861. 
Defendant's gesture of pointing his hand in-
side his coat pocket constituted a representa-
tion of a dangerous weapon. State v. Ireland, 
2005 UT App 209, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 113 
P.3d 1028. 
Unloaded firearm. 
Aggravated robbery may be committed with 
an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 
387 (Utah 1977). 
Cited in State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218 (Utah 
1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246 (Utah 
1985); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295 (Utah 
1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 
1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1986); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 
1988); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819 (1989); 
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 1066 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 176 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 
539 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d . — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3. 
C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 32 et seq. 
AX.R. — Fact that gun was unloaded as 
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 
507. 
Admissibility of expert opinion stating 
whether a particular knife was, or could have 
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th 
660. 
Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for pur-
poses of statutes aggravating offenses such as 
assault and robbery, 124 AX.R.5th 657. 
Robbery: Identification of victim as person 
named in indictment or information, 4 
A.L.R.6th 577. 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, 
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights 
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76-6-401 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise contain-
ing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature 
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade 
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical 
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the 
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances tha t make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct tha t is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe 
to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without 
disclosing a hen, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal 
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not 
a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not 
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend 
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-401, enacted by L. 
1973, eh. 196, § 76-6-401. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deception. 
Purpose to deprive. 
Cited. 
Deception. 
Subsection (a) in the definition of "deception" 
only applies to impressions of fact that are false 
at some present time; unfulfilled promises of 
future performance do not suffice as false rep-
resentations under tha t subsection. State v. 
Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
Under Subsection (b) in the definition of 
"deception," the previously created or con-
firmed impression of fact must be false when 
the property is obtained in order to constitute 
"deception." State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 
(Utah 1983). 
Under Subsection (e) in the definition of 
"deception," a promise of future performance 
can constitute deception when the promising 
party does not intend to perform or knows the 
promise will not be performed; a person knows 
that a promise will not be performed when he is 
aware that the promise is reasonably certain 
not to be performed. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant's false representations to a bank 
employee about his account and line of credit at 
other banks were sufficient to support finding 
of deception. State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). 
There is no conflict between § 76-7-203, 
which prohibits the payment of money to in-
duce the birth parents or legal guardian to 
place a child for adoption, and § 76-6-405, 
which prohibits obtaining control over someone 
else's property by deception; consequently, 
when unsuspecting potential adoptive parents, 
relying on the false representation made by the 
birth parents that they intended to place the 
child for adoption, paid their medical expenses, 
maternity expenses, and living expenses, the 
trial court did not err in concluding that theft 
by deception could occur in an adoption setting. 
State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Sufficient evidence existed to convict defen-
dant of theft by deception where he placed a 
price tag from a lower priced item on the item 
tha t he wanted to "buy" in order to deceive the 
cashier. (Unpublished decision.) State v. Clegg, 
2006 UT App 44. 
Purpose to deprive. 
Evidence was sufficient to establish defen-
dant's intent to deprive owner of his automobile 
where defendant drove the automobile in ex-
cess of 100 miles per hour when fleeing from 
police; told police when stopped tha t he owned 
the automobile; damaged the automobile by 
misuse; and drove the car from Utah to Califor-
nia without ever stating he would return the 
automobile to Utah. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 
880 (Utah 1978). 
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was 
inferred from the following facts: in 1984, de-
fendant began borrowing small amounts of 
money from the victim to buy pet food; the 
victim's generosity prompted defendant to 
make subsequent requests for larger sums to 
pay for everything from automobile repairs to 
medical bills; with each request, defendant in-
evitably promised to repay the victim soon or by 
a specific date; and between 1984 and 1986, 
defendant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid 
only about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Cited in Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F. 
Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1986); State v. Taylor, 884 
P.2d 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Bloom-
field, 2003 UT App 3,464 Utah Adv. Rep. 26,63 
P.3d 110; State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, 
474 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 71 P.3d 624. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah's New Penal 
Code: Theft, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 718. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 1 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 52B C.J.S. Larceny § 1. 
A.L.R. — Criminal liability for theft of, inter-
ference with, or unauthorized use of, computer 
programs, files, or systems, 51 A.L.R.4th 971. 
Cat as subject of larceny, 55 A.L.R.4th 1080. 
What is "trade secret" so as to render action-
able under state law its use or disclosure by 
former employee, 59 A.L.R.4th 641. 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory expla-
nation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property., 
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76-6-402 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
(2) It is no defense under this par t that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the 
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for 
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this par t that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-402, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 16. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Applicability to other offenses. 
Effect of presumption. 
Evidence. 
Explanation of possession. 
Instructions. 
—Good faith. 
—Other offenses. 
—Verbatim use of Subsection (1). 
Possession as corroborating evidence. 
Possession defined. 
Prima facie evidence. 
Questions of law and fact. 
Uncorroborated explanation of possession. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Prima facie evidence provision was not in-
valid as encroachment by legislature upon pre-
rogatives of judiciary. State v. Potello, 40 Utah 
56, 119 P. 1023 (1911). 
A jury instruction based on Subsection (1) did 
not infringe on the defendants' constitutional 
right to remain silent, since nothing in the 
instruction required testimony by the defen-
dants, because an explanation of possession 
could have been made by the testimony of other 
witnesses or by other evidence. State v. Cham-
bers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985). 
Use of the inference raised by possession of 
recently stolen property does not offend the 
federal constitution. State v. Graves, 717 P. 2d 
717 (Utah 1986). 
Subsection (1) does not force a defendant to 
take the stand in violation of his Fifth Amend-
ment right not to take the stand to testify. State 
v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986). 
Because the use of instructions allowing the 
inference of guilty knowledge upon unex-
plained possession does not offend the federal 
constitution and has been approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court for use in possession of 
stolen vehicle cases, such instructions used did 
not improperly expand Utah's statutory pre-
sumption under this section, nor did they im-
permissibly shift the burden of proof concern-
ing the mens rea requirement of the crime from 
the state to defendant found guilty of posses-
sion of a stolen vehicle. Although language 
allowing the inference that the defendant also 
stole the vehicle should have been omitted, 
such error was harmless as defendant was only 
charged with possession of a stolen vehicle. 
State v. Carlson, 934 P.2d 657 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
Applicabil i ty to other offenses. 
Recent possession of stolen property, when 
not satisfactorily explained, was also prima 
facie evidence of guilt of burglary or robbery, at 
least when larceny, burglary and robbery had 
been committed in same transaction. State v. 
Donovan, 77 Utah 343, 294 P. 1108 (1931). 
The presumption tha t a person in possession 
of recently stolen property stole the property 
when no satisfactory explanation of the posses-
sion is made applies to burglary cases. State v. 
Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978). 
Effect of presumption. 
Provision that unexplained possession of re-
cently stolen property was prima facie evidence 
of guilt in prosecution for larceny did not re-
lieve state of burden of convicting defendant 
upon all the evidence by proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. State v. Barretta, 47 Utah 479, 155 
P. 343 (1916); State v. Merritt, 67 Utah 325, 
247 P. 497 (1926). 
Possession of articles recently stolen, when 
coupled with circumstances of hiding or con-
cealing them, or of disposing or attempting to 
dispose of them, or of making false or unrea-
290 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 . 5 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation — Penalties. 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent of the 
owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, 
or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of 
possession of the property. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control 
by the actor is not presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal 
custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the property by any 
person. 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as 
provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been: 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a third degree felony if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a 
class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a class B misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; and 
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a class C misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation. 
(4) Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of the offense of theft 
under Section 76-6-404. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404.5, enacted by L. 
1998, ch. 138, § 1; 1999, ch. 21, § 100; 2001, 
ch. 48, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability. vehicle, § 41-la-1314 clearly takes precedence 
Because of its specificity as to motor vehicles, over this section. State v. Webster, 2001 UT 
in cases of wrongful appropriation of a motor App 238, 32 P.3d 976. 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely 
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an 
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to 
the public or to a class or group. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-405, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-405. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Distribution of imitation controlled substance. 
Constitutionality. Elements of offense. 
Adoption agreement. —Reliance. 
Attempted theft. Series of misrepresentations. 
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(c) "Rental company" means any person or organization in the business 
of providing motor vehicles to the public. 
(d) "Renter" means any person or organization obtaining the use of a 
motor vehicle from a rental company under the terms of a rental 
agreement. 
(2) A renter is guilty of theft of a rental vehicle if, without notice to and 
permission of the rental company, the renter knowingly fails without good 
cause to return the vehicle within 72 hours after the time established for the 
return in the rental agreement. 
(3) If the motor vehicle is not rented on a periodic tenancy basis, the rental 
company shall include the following information, legibly written, as part of the 
terms of the rental agreement: 
(a) the date and time the motor vehicle is required to be returned; and 
(b) the maximum penalties under state law if the motor vehicle is not 
returned within 72 hours from the date and time stated in compliance 
with Subsection (3)(a). 
History: C. 1953,76-6-410.5, enacted by L. 
2001, ch. 112, § 1. 
76-6-411. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Section 76-6-411, as enacted by tion of property subject to legal obligation, was 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-411, relating to theft by repealed by Laws 1974, ch. 32, § 41. 
failure to make required payment or disposi-
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(hi) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, 
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(hi) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(iii), is civilly 
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liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, § 18; 
1975, ch. 48, § 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch. 
78, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 14; 1996, ch. 139, § 1; 
1997, ch. 119, § 1; 1997, ch. 289, § 8. 
Cross-References. — Bus Passenger Safety 
Act, theft of baggage or cargo, § 76-10-1508. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Construction. 
Determining degree of crime. 
Elements of offense. 
Enhancement for prior offense. 
Evidence. 
—Prior convictions. 
Instructions. 
Lesser included offenses. 
Livestock. 
Single offense based on separate takings. 
Valuation of stolen property. 
—At time of theft. 
—Testimony of owner. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
This section, by making theft of certain live-
stock a third degree felony, irrespective of the 
value of the livestock, does not deny equal 
protection of the laws and does not violate the 
constitutional prohibition against private or 
special laws. State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 
1981). 
Construction. 
This section does not outline the elements of 
the crime of theft; it simply categorizes theft for 
sentencing purposes into various degrees of 
felonies and misdemeanors. Thus defendant 
was improperly charged under § 76-6-404 and 
this section with two separate counts of second 
degree theft for stealing both a firearm and 
property worth over $1000 in a single burglary; 
the crime was instead one theft offense under 
§ 76-6-404 punishable as a second degree fel-
ony under this section. State v. Casias, 772 
P.2d 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
No claim for treble damages based on § 76-
6-408(2)(d) and this section against businesses 
that regularly deal in large bulk orders of raw 
industrial material. See Alta Indus. Ltd. v. 
Hurst, 846 R2d 1282 (Utah 1993). 
Because the elements of felony theft in Sub-
section (l)(a)(iv) are distinct from those of mis-
demeanor theft in Subsection (l)(d), and the 
misdemeanor theft provision does not proscribe 
the same conduct as the felony provision, de-
fendant was properly charged with, and sen-
tenced under, the felony theft statute. State v. 
Green, 2000 UT App 33, 995 P.2d 1250. 
Determining degree of crime. 
In theft by deception, degree of the crime is 
determined by the value of the property ob-
tained by defendant as a result of the deception 
without reducing that amount by any value 
received by the victim. State v. Forshee, 588 
P.2d 181 (Utah 1978). 
Defendant's second degree felony conviction, 
based on a check written for exactly $1,000, 
was plain error, since he could only have been 
convicted of a third degree felony on the basis of 
the $1,000 check. State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 
260 (Utah 1985). 
Elements of offense. 
While both statutory prohibitions criminalize 
theft of properly, the misdemeanor theft provi-
sion does not require that the property be 
stolen from the person of another and is limited 
to less than $ 300 in value, whereas the felony 
theft provision has no value limitation and 
requires that the; theft be from the person, with 
the associated increase in the possibility of 
physical harm. State v. Green, 2000 UT App 33, 
995 R2d 1250. 
Enhancement for prior offense. 
The phrase "any burglary" in Subsection 
(l)(b)(ii) means any of the various burglary 
offenses in the criminal code, including bur-
glary of a vehicle. State v. Hall, 2008 UT App 
148, 184 P.3d 636. 
Evidence. 
State's use of color photographs of the stolen 
property for evidence rather than producing 
the actual tangible stolen property did not deny 
defendant due process of law. State v. 
Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982). 
—Prior convictions. 
A judgment of prior conviction must be writ-
ten, clear and definite, and signed by the court 
(or the clerk in a jury case) in order to serve as 
the basis for enhancing a penalty under this 
section. State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Instructions. 
It was reversible error to omit to instruct as 
to amount of debt owing by defendant on auto, 
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(b) the person charged has received the direct benefit of the reduction of 
the cost of the utility or cable television service. 
(4) A person who violates this section is guilty of the offense of theft of utility 
or cable television service. 
(a) In the case of theft of utility services, if the value of the gas, 
electricity, water, or sewer service: 
(i) is less than $500, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) is or exceeds $500 but is not more than $1,500, the offense is a 
class A misdemeanor; 
(iii) is or exceeds $1,500 but is not more than $5,000, the offense is 
a third degree felony; and 
(iv) is or exceeds $5,000 or if the offender has previously been 
convicted of a violation of this section, the offense is a second degree 
felony. 
(b) In the case of theft of cable television services, the penalties are 
prescribed in Section 76-6-412. 
(5) A person who violates this section shall make restitution to the utility or 
cable television company for the value of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or 
cable television service consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable 
expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this section. 
Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and costs for investigation, 
disconnection, reconnection, service calls, employee time, and equipment use. 
(6) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect the right of a 
utility or cable television company to bring a civil action for redress for 
damages suffered as a result of the commission of any of the acts prohibited by 
this section. 
(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy 
otherwise available to a utility or cable television company. 
History: C. 1953, § 76-6-409.3, enacted by ment, effective November 1, 2010, substituted 
L. 1987, ch. 38, § 3; 1989, ch. 30, § 2; 1990, "$500" for "$300" in (4)(a)(i) and (4)(a)(ii) and 
ch. 130, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 12; 2010, ch. substituted "$1,500" for a$l,000" in (4)(a)(ii) 
193, § 10. and (4)(a)(iii). 
Amendment Notes. — The 2010 amend-
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages [Effective November 1, 2010]. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter is punishable: 
(a) as a second degree felony if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
, (iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a third degree felony if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,500 but is 
less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of any of the offenses 
listed in this Subsection (l)(b)(ii), if each prior offense was committed 
within 10 years of the date of the current conviction or the date of the 
offense upon which the current conviction is based: 
(A) theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit 
theft; 
(B) any offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Par t 5, Fraud; or 
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65 OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-505 
(C) any attempt to commit any offense under Subsection 
(D(bXiiXA) or (B). 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $500 but is less than $1,500; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $500. * 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-*413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(iii), is civilly 
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, § 18; 
1975, ch. 48, § 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch. 
78, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 14; 1996, ch. 139, § 1; 
1997, ch. 119, § 1; 1997, ch. 289, § 8; 2010, 
ch. 193, § 11. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2010 amend-
ment, effective November 1, 2010, substituted 
"$l,500n for "$1,000" in (l)(b)(i) and (l)(c); 
added "any of the offenses listed in this Subsec-
tion (l)(b)(ii), if each prior offense was commit-
ted within 10 years of the date of the current 
conviction or the date of the offense upon which 
the current conviction is based" in the introduc-
tory language of (l)(b)(ii); added (l)(b)(ii)(B) 
and (C); substituted "$500" for "$300" in (l)(c) 
and (l)(d); and made related and stylistic 
changes. 
76-6-412.5. Property damage caused in the course of com-
mitting a theft. 
If a defendant who commits or attempts to commit theft as defined in Section 
76-6-404 of regulated metal as defined in Section 76-10-901 and in the course 
of committing or attempting to commit the theft causes damage to any person's 
real or personal property other than the regulated metal, the defendant is 
liable for restitution for all costs incurred due to the damage to the person's 
property. 
History: C. 1953,76-6-412.5, enacted by L. 
2009, ch. 325, § 2. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2009, ch. 325, § 6 
makes the act effective on March 25, 2009. 
Presumption 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft 
[Effective November 1, 2010]. 
(1) (a) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check or draft. 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person who issues a check or 
draft for which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the 
check or draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at 
the time of issue. 
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1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999); State v. Rogers, 2005 UT 
P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 App 379, 122 P.3d 661. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Consideration of sales tax in deter-
mining value of stolen property or amount of 
theft, 63 A.L.R.5th 417. 
76-6-413. Release of fur-bearing animals — Penalty — 
Finding. 
(1) In any case not amounting to a felony of the second degree, any person 
who intentionally and without permission of the owner releases any fur-
bearing animal raised for commercial purposes is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
(2) The Legislature finds that the release of fur-bearing animals raised for 
commercial purposes subjects the animals to unnecessary suffering through 
deprivation of food and shelter and compromises their genetic integrity, 
thereby permanently depriving the owner of substantial value. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-413, enacted by L. 
1997, ch . 119, § 2. 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — Elements of offense — "Writing" 
defined. 
(1) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(2) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters the 
altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication, or utter-
ance: 
(i) purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent; 
(ii) purports to be an act on behalf of another party with the 
authority of that other party; or 
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(iii) purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of 
an original when an original did not exist. 
(3) It is not a defense to a charge of forgery under Subsection (2)(b)(ii) if an 
actor signs his own name to the writing if the actor does not have authority to 
make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter the 
writing on behalf of the party for whom the actor purports to act. 
(4) Forgery is a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L. 
1973, eh. 196, § 76-6-501; 1974, eh. 32, § 19; 
1975, ch. 52, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 15; 1996, 
ch. 205, § 27; 2007, ch. 141, § 1. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2007 amend-
ment, effective April 30, 2007, redesignated 
former Subsection (2) as Subsection (1), added 
Subsections (2)(b)(ii) and (3), and made related 
and stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Attempt. 
Authority to use forged signature. 
Computer crimes distinguished. 
Defenses. 
—Insanity. 
—Postdated check. 
Elements of offense. 
—Making and passing. 
—Passing. 
—Signature. 
Evidence. 
—Handwriting. 
—Insufficient. 
—Other crimes. 
—Sufficient. 
False pretenses distinguished. 
Fictitious name. 
Identity theft distinguished. 
Indictment or information. 
—Variance. 
Intent. 
Lesser included offense. 
"Make" or "utter." 
Prescription. 
Sentencing. 
Signature. 
—In general. 
—Authority to sign another's name. 
Standard of proof. 
Theft consolidation rule. 
Uttering. 
Verdict. 
Cited. 
Attempt. 
Where information charging offense of forg-
ery contained one count for forgery and another 
for uttering, attempt to ut ter could be shown, 
for it was immaterial that attempt to utter was 
unsuccessful; it was fact of uttering or attempt-
ing to utter that was of evidentiary value. State 
v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936). 
The crime of attempted forgery involves the 
same culpability and dishonesty as does the 
crime of forgery itself. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 
529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Authority to use forged signature. 
Where defendant forged his accomplice's 
name on checks which accomplice owned but 
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks 
and split the proceeds with the accomplice, 
defendant committed forgery as defined under 
Subsection (l)(b), notwithstanding that the ac-
complice authorized defendant to sign his 
name. State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah 
1979). 
Computer cr imes dist inguished. 
The elements of the computer crimes statute, 
§ 76-6-703, are distinct from those of this sec-
tion, insurance fraud, § 76-6-521, and commu-
nications fraud, § 76-10-1801, and, thus, it was 
within the prosecutor's discretion to charge and 
the trial court's authority to sentence defen-
dant for computer crimes, rather than the 
crimes carrying lesser penalties. State v. Kent, 
945 P.2d 145 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Defenses. 
—Insanity. 
Insanity, if sufficiently established, would 
constitute defense to a charge of forgery. State 
v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P . 641, 24 L.R.A. 
(n.s.) 545 (1909). 
—Postdated check. 
In prosecution for forgery, fact that forged 
check was postdated did not help defendant, 
who had attempted to pass it. State v. Green, 
89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936). 
Elements of offense. 
—Making and pass ing. 
Crime of forgery could consist of making of 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _32-
The defendant, MICHELLE ANN COX, is charged in Count II with THEFT BY 
DECEPTION,; , in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-405, 
as amended. You cannot convict her of this offense unless you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt, based on the evidence, each of the following elements: 
L That the defendant MICHELLE ANN COX, 
2. in Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. obtained or exercised control over the property of another ; 
4. by deception and with a purpose to deprive the other thereof; and 
S* the value of said property was or exceeded $300.00 but was less 
than $1,000.00 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that 
each and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of 
these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant NOT GUILTY. 
In reaching your decision, the following shall apply. 
"Property" means anything of value. "Property" includes but is not limited to 
tangible and intangible personal property, and written instruments or other writings 
representing or embodying rights concerning personal property or otherwise containing 
anything of value to the owner. 
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A person engages in conduct knowingly or with knowledge with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly or with knowledge 
with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
"Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect 
the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true. 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object to : 
(a) Withhold property permanently, or 
(b) Dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 3 j 
is a defense to the charge of theft by deception that the Defendant: 
(a) acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved; or 
(b) acted in the honest belief that she had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service involved; or 
(c) obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly believing 
that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
Evidence of this defense must be presented by the defense, and if presented 
the State retains its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of 
the offense charged. 
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